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Fiscal Policy, the Real Exchange Rate,
and Commodity Prices
The role of the international commodity market in transmzttmg dis-
turbances is considered in a model that incorporates commodities as an
input in production. The analysis employs a three-country framework: a
liquidity-constrained commodity supplier and two industrial countries that
import the commodity, export differentiated manufactured goods, and
hold the outstanding debt of the commodity exporter. In this setting the
impact of changes in fiscal policy, commodity supplies, and the real interest
rate are assessed. Particular attention is paid to the responses of the real
exchange rate, commodity prices, and the international distribution of debt
to the various shocks. [JEL F41, F42]
THE 1980S witnessed marked changes in the fiscal deficits of the majorindustrial countries and large fluctuations in real rates of interest and
key relative prices, including real exchange rates and world commodity
prices. The increased volatility in the economic environment, as well as
a world debt crisis, stimulated a reassessment of the role of fiscal policies.
The increasing integration of capital markets, which insures that policies
undertaken by the major economies have repercussions on the rest of the
world, made a multicountry setting necessary.
For much of the literature on the international transmission of fiscal
policies, a frequent point of departure has been the Mundell-Fleming
two-country model (Mundell (1968», which considered intratemporal
choices among goods and assets. In this setting, a fiscal expansion appre-
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ciates the real exchange rate, which, in turn, increases the demand for
the products of trading partners-the transmission abroad is positive.
Frenkel and Razin (1984) revisited this framework and incorporated an
intertemporal dimension by modeling the consumer choice problem with
infinitely lived, rational agents. They examined the linkage between fiscal
policy and the intertemporal price of consumption-the real rate of
interest-and assessed the international transmission mechanism of fiscal
policies in a short-run framework that took output levels as given. The
impact of fiscal policy in the Frenkel-Razin framework is ambiguous,
depending on the consumption patterns of the public and private sectors
in both countries, as well as their spending propensities.
To bypass the world of "Ricardian equivalence," where there is no
difference between the individual and aggregate rate of time preference,
Frenkel and Razin (1986) subsequently re-examined these issues in a
setting where individuals face an uncertain lifetime, as in Blanchard
(1985). In addition to intratemporal and intertemporal preferences, they
found that the impact of fiscal policy depends on its timing. Buiter (1987)
and Giovannini (1988) extended this framework to incorporate capital
accumulation, thus endogenizing output levels and giving factor markets
a key role in the international transmission of shocks.l The inclusion of
capital allowed these models to examine the impact fiscal policy and
public debt management have on aggregate supply at both the country-
specific and world levels. Obstfeld (1989) enriched the analysis by drop-
ping the assumption of complete specialization that characterized these
models, introducing the production of labor-intensive, nontradable
goods; in his model the impact of public spending, at home and abroad,
depended crucially on whether the government purchased the traded or
the non traded good. All of these models illustrate how changes in fiscal
policy affect relative prices and resource allocation, domestically and
internationally.
In Frenkel and Razin (1984, 1986), as in the earlier Mundell (1968)
work, the channel of international transmission of fiscal policy is via
demand, since output supplies are exogenously given. In the growth
models, the international transmission of fiscal disturbances also works
through the supply side-via its impact on factor markets. All of these
models excluded monetary considerations, but parallel to this literature
the international effects of fiscal policies in monetary models were as-
sessed by Frenkel and Mussa (1984), Frenkel and Razin (1987), Guidotti
and Vegh (1988), and Stockman (1986), among others.
1Buiter's (1987) investment function incorporates costs of adjustment, while
Giovannini's (1988) does not.
These papers commonly assume a two-country world, in which the
countries are similar in consumption patterns, production technology, or
both. The countries considered in these models may be borrowers or
lenders, but in any case face no constraints in international capital mar-
kets. The events of the 1980s, however, suggest that an expansion of this
two-country setting is needed to consider the international transmission
of fiscal disturbances to trading partners with very different characteris-
tics, particularly the marked differences between developed and develop-
ing countries. Although preferences and even technology may not differ
considerably, in recent years developed and developing countries have
not had equal access to international capital markets. Consider, for in-
stance, the summary statistics in Table 1, which underscore the differ-
ences in economic performance among the United States, the other major
industrial countries, and the developing nations. This paper attempts to
explain this dispersion, giving particular attention to the borrowing con-
straints faced by developing countries and other stylized facts, in partic-
ular, the observed inverse relationship between real commodity prices (in
U.S. dollars) and the U.S. real exchange rate (see Dornbusch (1985)).
This paper, like Frenkel and Razin (1984, 1986), presents a nonmon-
etary economy without capital, but as in the growth models, a supply
Years
1981~5
U.S. Government expenditure
as a percentage of GNP
(period average)
U.S. budget deficit as a percentage of GNP
(period average)
U.S. real exchange rate" (percentage change)
Real non-oil commodity pricesb in U.S. dollars
(percentage change)
U.S. real GDP (percentage change)
Real GDP of non-oil, primary commodities exporters
(percentage change)
Real GDP of all industrial countries
(percentage change)
Sources: International Monetary Fund (1990a, 1990b).
"International Monetary Fund index based on export unit values.
b International Monetary Fund all-commodity index deflated by the U.S. con-
sumer price index.
2.9
-2.0
2.3
18.3
4.7
45.1
-41.9
13.5
channel of transmission is established by the introduction of an inter-
nationally traded, nonstorable commodity input. Although world output
is fixed, its distribution across countries varies with shocks to interna-
tional factor markets. Unlike the previous models, which consider a two-
country world, this analysis follows Krugman (1983) and employs a
three-country framework: a liquidity-constrained commodity supplier
that has no further access to the international credit markets, and two
industrial countries that import the commodity, export differentiated
manufactured goods, and hold the outstanding debt of the commodity
exporter. The inclusion of commodities in the analysis is similar to
Findlay and Rodriguez (1977), although this study goes beyond their
small-country case. The three-country framework reveals how the inter-
national transmission of fiscal policy differs across trading partners that
have a diverse production structure and, more important, a different
indebtedness profile.
In this setting, the impact is considered of a permanent change in fiscal
policy on the real exchange rate, real commodity prices, output, and the
international distribution of debt. The focus is on the reallocative effects
of fiscal policy a la Metzler (1949), since it considers tax-financed, rather
than debt-financed, increases in government spending. The analysis ex-
tends the work of Reinhart (1988) in two directions. First, it takes into
account the intertemporal nature of the consumer choice problem, so
that the role of wealth effects stemming from changes in asset supplies
and/or the international redistribution of existing assets is explicitly
considered. Second, it introduces a role for the debt of developing coun-
tries and highlights how the presence of financial constraints alters the
response of the system to a variety of shocks.
The following section describes the model, and Section II uses that
model to analyze the effects of changes in fiscal policy, as well as a change
in world commodity supplies. Section III considers the impact of a change
in the rate of time preference in the basic model under two scenarios:
first, the inherited stock of debt has a variable-rate structure and instan-
taneous maturity; and second, the debt is a consol with a fixed coupon
payment. Section IV presents the conclusions and discusses possible
extensions.
factors in production: labor, which, is country specific (that is, there is
no cross-country migration); and a nonstorable commodity, which is
internationally traded and imported by both countries. The developing
country, C, employs only labor in producing its commodity export.
Following the usual neoclassical assumptions, the supplies of the non-
traded input, labor, are predetermined in all three countries. This as-
sumption also fixes the supply of the commodity. As in Buiter (1987) and
Giovannini (1988), full specialization in production is assumed. Country
A produces good 1, and country B produces good 2. These two goods are
assumed to be imperfect substitutes, and their relative price is defined by
R = Pl/p2, which I refer to as the real exchange rate.
It is assumed that the commodity supplier at some point in the past
floated a "development bond" but can no longer issue new debt. This
bond, which was denominated in terms of good 1, is the only asset in the
system and is held entirely by the residents of the industrial countries,
who receive interest payments. The assumption that the commodity
supplier is shut out of the credit markets plays a significant role in the
analysis. In a model such as this, which assumes infinitely lived house-
holds all sharing common intertemporal preferences, this limitation in
the credit markets introduces an important asymmetry between the in-
dustrial lenders and the developing borrowers. The former's consump-
tion choice is indeed intertemporal in nature, while the latter is limited
to maximizing utility on a period-by-period basis. Whereas in Frenkel
and Razin (1986) and in the growth models of Buiter, Giovannini, and
Obstfeld, the nonneutrality of public debt arose from the "myopic"
behavior of households, here it stems from an exogenous rigidity in the
form of a liquidity constraint.
The role accorded to liquidity constraints in explaining consumer be-
havior in closed economy settings is not new. 2 Their relevance in explain-
ing the consumption patterns of households with low net worth that
cannot trade future assets with current liabilities has found considerable
empirical support in several industrial countries (Hayashi (1987) provides
a survey of this literature). Studies of a broad variety of developing
countries by Haque and Montiel (1989) and Rossi (1988) also find evi-
dence of liquidity constraints, suggesting that the closed economy pat-
terns across households may well have their parallels in a multicountry
setting.
All three countries are inhabited by infinitely lived households that
possess perfect foresight and maximize
V, = f~o U[Cl" c2t]exp[-8t]dt,
where 8 > 0 is the subjective rate of time preference common to all three
countries; Cl and C2represent consumption of goods 1 and 2, respectively;
and
U[Cb C2] = alnc! + (1 - a)lnc2, 0 < a < 1.
As in Obstfeld (1989), household preferences are assumed to be identical
across countries, and good 1, the good in which the debt is denominated,
will be the numeraire. In the horne country A, households receive wage
income from current production, pay lump-sum taxes to the government,-r: , and receive interest income on their holdings of the bond, B~. If ,-A
is the interest rate (in terms of good 1), the flow budget constraint of the
representative household in country A is given by
DBA = y~ - m~ (qlpl)' - -r: + r: B~ - cft - c1r1R" (1)
where the D defines the time derivative; y: is the output of good 1; and
m: (qlpl)' is the value of the commodity import in terms of the horne good
and the initial holding of the bond, B~ > o.
Maintaining good 1 as the numeraire, the representative household in
country B maximizes utility, subject to
DBB = y~ IR, - m~ (qlpl)' + r: B~ - crr - c~/R,. (2)
The liquidity constraint faced by the commodity exporter reduces the
budget constraint to
yC(qlpl)' = r: BC + cft + c~ IR" (3)
where BC is the constant outstanding stock of debt, and yC is the exoge-
nously given level of output.
Combining u(.) with the relevant budget constraint and introducing the
costate variables, ~: (where i = A, B, and C) leads to Hamiltonians of
the form3
3To economize on space, the expressions for country B and country Care
omitted. In the case of country C, the maximization problem reduces to a static
Langrangian.
HA = f~o[alnct, + (1 - a)lnc~]exp[-ot]dt
+ fJ.~[y~ - m~ (qlpl)' - -r: + r: B~ - ct, - c~/Rc. (4)
The first-order conditions yield relationships between consumption of
goods 1 and 2 that hold at each instant in time:
j _ (1 - a) j R
C2J - CI, I,
a
Substituting (5) back into the relevant budget constraint yields the follow-
ing expressions for consumption of the home good in countries A, B, and
C, respectively:
ct, = a[y~ - m~ (qlpl)' - -r: + r: B~] (6a)
eft = a[y~ 1R1- m~ (qlpl)' + r: B~] (6b)
e~ = a[y; (qlpl)1 - r:B;]. (6c)
Dynamics place consumption in countries A and B along the optimal
paths given by the Euler equations:
Dct, = ct, (r: - 0) (7a)
Dcft = eft (r: - 0). (7b)
Since employment is assumed constant, output can be expressed exclu-
sively in terms of the commodity input. The production functions for
countries A and B are given by
y~=-yln(m~) -y>0 (8)
y~ = E In (m~) E > O. (9)
Since the commodity is nonstorable and there is no capital, profit max-
imization is done on a period-by-period basis. Demand for the commod-
ity input derived from setting marginal product equal to marginal cost
leads to
Given the functional forms assumed, world demand for the commodity
is characterized by a rectangular hyperbola.
Closing the system requires specifying the behavior of the public sector.
To focus on the reallocative effects of government spending, the govern-
ment is assumed to run a balanced budget and the lump-sum tax levied
on the households of the home country, T~, is assumed to be directed
entirely to the purchase of the home good, as in Metzler (1949).4 These
purchases are denoted by g~. All markets clear continuously; the equi-
librium conditions for the commodity, good 1, and good 2, respectively,
are given by
yf = m~ + m~
y~ = gt, + et, + eft + e~
(11)
(12)
y~ = e~ + e~ + e~. (13)
Clearing of the asset market requires that all debt be held:
Be = B~ + B~. (14)
Relative prices are solved for by imposing market clearing in three of
the four markets and invoking Walras' law. The appropriate substitutions
in equation (11) yield an expression for the domestic real commodity
price, (qlpl)" in terms of the real exchange rate and the exogenously
determined supply of commodities:
This market-clearing condition lies at the heart of the inverse correla-
tion between real commodity prices (in U.S. dollars) and the U.S. real
exchange rate found in the data by Dornbusch (1985), Morrison and
Wattleworth (1988), and Gilbert (1989). This theoretical model suggests
that this sensitivity of commodity prices to the real exchange rate should
depend on the relative elasticities of industrial country output with re-
spect to commodity prices, and so would lie between 0 and -1. There is
far less agreement in the empirical literature about the magnitude of this
4The significance of assuming that the government only purchases the domes-
tically produced good will become more evident in the next section when a change
in fiscal policy is considered.
coefficient, but many of the studies cited estimate it to be higher (see
Gilbert (1989».
Substituting equations (6a)-(6c) into the market-clearing condition for
good 1 (equation (12» and using the results from equation (15) yields a
reduced-form expression for the real exchange rate:
dR/R = {(I - a) R}/Cf>dg~ + {aE - (1 - a)-yR}/Cf> dyc/yc, (16)
Cf> = E"(R/(-yR + E) + ayB > O.
As equations (15) and (16) show, relative prices depend on the exoge-
nously given commodity endowment and government spending. Note
that the numerator of the government multiplier, (1 - a), measures the
difference between public and private preferences for good 1. The as-
sumption, thus far, has been that the government only consumes the
domestically produced good-its propensity to consume good lout of tax
receipts is unity-while the private sector consumes a.
Since preferences are identical across countries, relative prices do not
depend on the international distribution of wealth. However, because
consumption in countries A and B (equations (6a) and (6b» depends on
the distribution of the internationally traded asset, B: , the solution to the
system requires that the path of the interest rate on the bond, r:, be
established. Following Guidotti and Vegh (1988), I subsequently show
that in this system the interest rate will equal the subjective rate of time
preference, 8, for all t. The continuous equality between the rate oftime
preference and the world interest rate has the implication that asset dis-
tribution at any point in time will equal the initial endowment, (B: = B~
for all t), and adjustment to disturbances occurs instantaneously.
To establish this, consider the market-clearing condition for good 1.
Since the market clears at each point in time, and as equations (15) and
(16) show, relative prices and output adjust instantaneously, changes in
demand over any period of time must sum to zero; that is
0= Deft + Dee + De~.
The first two terms on the right-hand side are given by the Euler
conditions, while the last follows from differentiating equation (6c) with
respect to time.5 Making these substitutions leads to
0= eft (~ - 8) + ee (~ - 8) - aBcDrA. (17)
5The intuition behind consumption dynamics of households in country C,
Dec = -o.BcD~, is straightforward. Unless country C residents opt to default
on their debt servicing, consumption must be declining when the interest rate is
rising, and vice versa.
Since consumption in the industrial countries moves together (sign of
Dc:C = sign of Dc~), market clearing requires that consumption in coun-
try C move in the opposite direction.6 This, as equation (17) illustrates,
requires that ,-A follow an· unstable dynamic equation when linearized
around the steady state. Under the assumption of rationality, or more
precisely, perfect foresight, agents would rule out explosive paths and
choose the interest associated with the stable dynamics-that is, an in-
terest rate equal to the constant subjective rate of time preference. Thus,
stability rules out intrinsic dynamics, and the system is characterized by
instantaneous adjustment from one steady state to another.
The reduced forms for consumption in each country are given by
dct = {_a2[yB + E(mAlyC)]}/<I>dgt
+ {a2-y(yB + E)}/<I>dyClyC (18a)
dcf = {-a(1 - a)[yB - e(mBlyC)]}/<I>dgt
+ {a(qlpl)[a(mBlyC)(yB + E)
- yB(a - (mA/yC)}/<I>dyClyc (18b)
dcf = {-a(1 - a)e}/<I>dgt
- {ae[a - (mAlyC)](qlpl)}/<I>dyClyc, (18c)
and output in countries A and B is given by
dyA = {(I - a)e(mAlyC)}/<I> dgt + {a-y( yB + E)}/<I>dyClyC (19a)
dyB = -{(I - a)E[(mAlyC) R)}/<I> dgt
+ {eR[ayBIR + (1 - a)-y)}/<I>dyClyC. (19b)
In this section two of the shocks that fit the stylized facts of the 1980s
are considered. In particular, shocks that parallel the fiscal expansion in
the United States and the sharp increase in the commodity exports of the
developing countries are examined.
Increase in Government Spending
In this simple trade model, the government of country A finances its
purchases of the home good by levying a lump-sum tax on households.
6 Output of good 1, yA, has no intrinsic dynamics since it depends only on
relative prices, which adjust instantaneously.
The impact of government spending on relative prices, output, and
consumption comes entirely from its role in the reallocation of demand,
as in Metzler (1949). A permanent increase in government spending tilts
demand in favor of the home good and drives up its relative price. The
real exchange rate, R" appreciates, and real commodity prices, (q Ipl)"
fall. The decline in real commodity prices increases the home country's
demand for the commodity input, and output in country A expands. At
the same time, commodity costs for country B, (q Ipl),R" rise with the
fiscal expansion, leading to a decline in its output. Thus, the international
transmission of a fiscal expansion in country A is negative.
Household consumption in the industrial countries declines. In the
home country output is higher, but the higher taxes that finance the
increase in spending reduce household disposable income. In the second
industrial country, B, disposable income falls, owing to lower production
and a deterioration in the terms of trade. The commodity exporting
country also faces a deterioration in its terms of trade that reduces the
value of its output, or alternatively expressed, that increases the burden
of debt servicing.7 Households in country C would like to maintain their
level of consumption and, in the absence of a liquidity constraint, would
have been able to do so by borrowing from country A or (country B).
Instead, their inability to borrow forces the entire adjustment on con-
sumption, which also falls. In effect, the liquidity constraint has a shadow
price that functions as an interest rate, so that when it is binding, the
consumer behaves as if he or she faced a higher interest rate.
All of these results obtain if the government's propensity to consume
the home good exceeds that of the representative household. If, for
instance, the government consumes both goods in the same proportion
as households, then the numerator of the government multiplier in equa-
tion (16) would be (a - a), and relative prices would remain unchanged,
since private consumption of good 1 in country A falls by -a-l,', while
public consumption increases by the same amount (recall that the govern-
ment maintains a balanced budget).8 As a result, world spending on both
goods remains unchanged.
This simple model can describe the observed direction of movement
in relative prices and even the differential economic performance of the
early 1980s (see Tables 1 and 2).9 However, the model, which imposes
7Recall the debt is denominated in terms of the good whose relative price has
risen.
BIn this case, the market-clearing condition for good 2 (equation (13», would
be revised to include an additional term, g~, representing government purchases
of that good.
9 Although one can only make statements about output levels, since this is not
a growth model.
Table 2. Commodity Supply and Related Data
(Percent change)
Price and Quantity Indicators
Terms of trade of non-oil, primary commodity
exporting countries
Commodity supply index
Export volme of 15 heavily indebted countries
Sources: International Monetary Fund (1990a, 1990b).
1977-82
5.3
17.9
1983-87
20.0
25.3
balanced current accounts, falls well short of explaining the marked
swings in the current accounts of industrial and developing countries that
also characterized the past decade. Most likely, the absence of debt-
financed public expenditure, as well as a monetary sector, accounts for
this lack in the analysis.
During the 1980s the terms of trade of developing commodity suppliers
deteriorated markedly while their real debt-servicing costs rose.lO This
unfavorable combination led many developing countries to try to increase
the volume of their exports, so as to make up for the shortfall in revenues.
However, since many commodity exporters responded similarly, the
outcome was an expansion in world commodity supplies, which further
aggravated the decline in their relative price. As Morrison and Wattle-
worth (1988) note, this supply expansion played a significant role in ex-
plaining the observed weakness in relative commodity prices in 1984-86,
despite the rapidly recovering demand for commodities in industrial
countries.
In the basic model, the impact of a permanent expansion in world
commodity supply, yC, follows intuition. As with the fiscal shock, the
adjustment is instantaneous. The expansion in commodity exports re-
duces the real price of the commodity, (qlpl)' (equation (15)), while the
impact of the real exchange rate is ambiguous, since it depends on tastes
and technology. As the numerator of the multiplier of the commodity
stock (equation (16)) makes clear, if good 1 is consumed in a higher
proportion than good 2 (that is, a > (1 - a)), other things equal, then
IOFora model that links the terms of trade to debt, as well as for a discussion
of key stylized facts in this area, see Aizenman and Borensztein (1988).
the increase in world output increases world demand for good 1 by more
than it increases demand for good 2, driving its relative price higher. If
production of good 2 uses the commodity input more intensively than
good 1 (that is, E > 'Y), other things equal, then the production of good
2 rises relative to the output of good 1, and its relative price declines (that
is, R goes up). In either case, the cost of the commodity input declines,
thereby increasing output in the industrial countries A and B.ll The
higher levels of output, assuming they are not taxed away, increase
disposable income and boost consumption in the commodity importing
countries (equations (18a) and (18b».
For the commodity supplier, the value of its output may increase or
decrease, depending on the ambiguous real exchange rate response.
World demand for the commodity input is characterized by a rectangular
hyperbola; if no other relative prices change, country C's revenues re-
main unchanged, since the output increase is exactly offset by a price
decline (equation (15». If the real exchange appreciates, world commod-
ity demand declines, since the decline in country B's commodity costs is
smaller. In such a scenario, the decline in commodity prices (in terms of
good 1) more than offsets the increase in output, and the value of country
C's output declines. With debt-servicing costs constant, a fall in consump-
tion absorbs the shock. In this case, the gap between the value of output
of the developed countries and the developing coun~ry widens.
One of the more unrealistic and uninteresting features of the model is
the assumption of an exogenous, common, and constant rate of time
preference. Frenkel and Razin (1984, 1987) allow for different discount
factors across countries, while Buiter (1987), Frenkel and Razin (1986),
Giovannini (1988), and Obstfeld (1989) all follow Blanchard (1985) in
assuming that individuals face an uncertain duration of life. Although the
latter assumption relaxes the Ricardo-Barro equivalence of debt issue
and taxation, the steady-state solution of these models still requires that
the real interest rate be determined by, although not necessarily set equal
to, an aggregate and exogenous rate of time preference. An alternative
approach that endogenizes the subjective utility discount factor is pre-
sented in Obstfeld (1981).12
\I In the case where the real exchange rate appreciates, the output expansion
in country B is smaller than when the real exchange rate depreciates.
12For a survey of this literature, see Obstfeld (1990).
Table 3. Real Interest Rates and Savings Trends
Period
Interest and Savings Rate Indicators
Ex post real interest rate" (period average)
Saving rates
Industrial countries: householdsb 9.5 8.1
Developing countries: national" 26.9 22.7
Sources: International Monetary Fund (1990a, 1990b), Aghevli and others
(1990), and World Bank (1989).
Note: Total long-term debt at floating rates for the 15 heavily indebted coun-
tries for 1973-75, 1980-82, and 1987 was 11.4 percent, 34.4 percent, and 51.4
percent, respectively.
"Defined as the six-month LIBOR rate less the annual inflation rate in indus-
trial countries.
b Aggregate of the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and
Canada.
"Household data were not available; averages are for 1976-81 and 1982-85.
1976-80
0.51
1981-85
5.78
In the analysis that follows, an attempt is made to capture the spirit of
an "endogenous" rate of time preference by considering the impact of
changes in the rate of time preference under alternative debt scenarios. 13
The motivation for this exercise lies in the events of the 1980s. Although
the rate of time preference is not observable, the combination of signif-
icantly higher (ex post) real rates of interest and declining savings rates
worldwide suggests a shift toward favoring consumption today-an in-
crease in the rate of time preference. I subsequently consider how the
system's adjustment to a higher real rate of interest is influenced by the
nature of the existing debt stock, namely, whether the debt bears a fixed
or variable rate (see Table 3).
As with the other shocks considered, a permanent change in the rate
of time preference results in an instantaneous adjustment. For house-
holds in country C, this increased preference for consuming today cannot
be translated into an increase in consumption, since a binding liquidity
constraint prevents its residents from engaging in consumption smooth-
ing. In the developed countries, households would not be willing to hold
the existing stock of debt at an interest rate that is below their, now
higher, subjective discount factor. Accordingly, asset market clearing
13This exercise was also analyzed by Giovannini (1988) for the small open
economy case.
will require that the real interest rate increase sufficiently, so as to insure
that all debt is willingly held. This rise in the interest rate increases
interest income for residents of A and B and finances a higher level of
consumption.
For the debt-constrained citizens of country C, consumption adjusts
according to Dce = -aBcDr-. Therefore, in order to meet the higher
level of interest payments (for a given level of output), households must
reduce their consumption. In the new steady state, the commodity sup-
plier will have a larger merchandise trade surplus offsetting the deficit in
the capital account.
The assumption that all debt yields an instantaneously adjusted vari-
able interest rate produces the starkly negative implications for consump-
tion and welfare of the debtor country when the discount factor, which
anchors the world interest rate, rises. Despite rapid increases in recent
years in the share of developing country debt that is variable rate, as of
1987nearly 50 percent of the stock of debt of the 15most heavily indebted
countries was still at fixed rates (Table 3). An alternative scenario is
considered here, which although less descriptive of the stylized facts of
developing country debt, provides a benchmark against which the previ-
ous results can be compared.
Consider the polar case: the development bond, BC, is a consol promis-
ing fixed-stream coupon payments (in terms of good 1) to its holders. In
this case, country C's budget constraint is given by
yC(qfpl)' = kBc + ct + c~fR
"
(20)
where k represents the fixed coupon payment in terms of good 1, and BC
now represents the number of bonds outstanding. As equation (20)
illustrates, the fixed coupon payments insulate the debtor's consumption
from fluctuations in the rate of interest, which now has two components--
coupon payments and capital gains or losses. Defining v, as the price of
the bond (in terms of good 1), the instantaneous rate of interest is given
by
r~ = (kfv,) + Dvfv, (21)
where Dvfv represents the changes in the price of the bond-<:apital gains
or losses. The budget constraints for the creditor countries arel4
141t is evident that the price of the bond, V" cancels out of the budget constraint,
but it will be retained for the time being to facilitate illustrating what happens
when intertemporal preferences change.
DBA = y~ - m~ (qlpl)' - -r'( + (klvt)(v,B~) - e~ - e~IR, (22)
DBB = y~/R, - m~(qlpl)t + (klvt)(v,B~) - eft - e~IR,. (23)
As equation (22) indicates, a permanent increase in the common discount
rate would leave consumption in the debtor country unchanged, since
neither output nor its debt-servicing payments have changed. In the new
steady state we know that (1) the interest rate equals the now higher rate
of time preference; and (2) the value of the bond will be stationary,
Dvlv = O. These situations imply that when the rate of time preference
rises, the price of the bond, v" instantaneously declines. Households in
countries A and B would like to reduce their holding of country C's debt
to consume more. This provides no incentive to trade and, instead, after
the change in tastes, the value of debt, vtB~, falls, while the yield, klv"
rises by the same proportion. Consequently, the consumption of the debt
holders also remains unchanged. In the case where the debtor country
faces a liquidity constraint, the existence offixed-rate debt helps insulate
the consumer against fluctuations in interest rates.
A simple multicountry model where individuals are infinitely lived but
some agents face a liquidity constraint can provide some insight into
fluctuations of key relative prices and the disparate economic perfor-
mance among developed and developing countries that have character-
ized recent years. As in Giovannini (1988) and Obstfeld (1989), this
framework highlights the important role of international factor markets,
in this case the commodity market, in transmitting a variety of shocks.
The analysis has highlighted how an expansive fiscal policy in a large
country can have negative output and consumption consequences for
trading partners with different indebtedness and production profiles. In
the second industrial country disposable income falls, owing to lower
production and a deterioration in the terms of trade. The commodity
exporting country also faces a deterioration in its terms of trade that
reduces the value of its output, or increases the burden of debt servicing.
Households in the commodity producing country would like to maintain
their level of consumption and, in the absence of a liquidity constraint,
would have been able to do so by borrowing from its trading partners.
Instead, their inability to borrow forces the entire adjustment upon
consumption, which also falls.
It has also been shown how the system's adjustment to a higher real
rate of interest is influenced by the nature of the existing debt stock,
namely, whether the debt bears a fixed or variable rate. In the case where
all debt is variable rate, a rise in the interest rate increases interest income
for the residents of the industrial countries and finances a higher level of
consumption. For the debt-constrained citizens of the developing coun-
try, consumption has to decline in order to meet the higher level of
interest payments. The new steady state requires that the commodity
supplier have a larger merchandise trade surplus to offset the wider deficit
in the capital account. By contrast, if the debt is a consol with a fixed
coupon payment, an increase in the common discount factor leaves
consumption of both debtors and lenders unchanged. In the case where
the debtor country faces a liquidity constraint, the existence of fixed-rate
debt helps insulate the consumer against fluctuations in interest rates.
There are, however, a series of simplifying assumptions that limit the
model's usefulness for analyzing the international transmission of fiscal
disturbances in recent years. The absence of a second asset, whether in
the form of capital, money, or more interesting, an industrial country
bond that allows for debt-financed fiscal deficits, is a major drawback.
The inclusion of bond-financed deficits in an uncertain lifetime setup,
such as Blanchard (1985), is an extension that would alter the basic
model's unrealistic result of continual current account balance.
Additional extensions to the basic model could be along the lines of
Antonnini (1987), which by allowing for storability of the commodity
input, adds an intertemporal dimension to firms' profit-maximization
problem. Such an emendation provides an additional channel through
which the government could influence the prices of internationally traded
commodities by its purchases and sales of inventory stocks. Finally, it
would be useful to consider endogenizing the rate of time preference as
in Obstfeld (1990), which allows the initial level of consumption (which
could be quite different across countries) to playa role in influencing the
discount factor applied to future utility.
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